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TURNABOUT TOWARD FAIR PLAY:
THE NLRB'S REVISED APPROACH
TO UNION OFFICER SUPERSENIORITY
In 1935 Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' to
protect the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively with an
employer. 2 The NLRA outlined the rights and obligations of employers and
employees 3 and established a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 4 that

1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (National Labor Relations Act is directed toward dual purpose of unburdening commerce by easing labor relations and protecting workers' exercise of freedom
of association). In enacting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Congress sought to equalize
the bargaining power of employers and employees, thereby enhancing the ability of employees
to bargain effectively with management and minimizing the impact of labor unrest on the economy.
See S. REP. No. 573, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATrVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABoR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2300, 2302 (1949) (attainment of industrial
peace and balancing of bargaining power between employers and employees are two principal
objectives of NLRA); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1935), reprintedin 2 NLRB,
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 3046, 3054-56 (1949)
LEGISLA=Tr
(two principal objectives of NLRA are reducing labor strife and bolstering employees' economic

position). Congress sought to equalize the bargaining power of employers and employees by creating
a regulated collective bargaining system. See 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner),
reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEcISLi.ATE HISTORY OF THE NATiONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at
15 (1949) (fortification and regulation of collective bargaining process is necessary predicate to
equalization between employer and employee bargaining power since collective bargaining is sole
means of achieving equality).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (employees have right to bargain collectively or to refrain
from collective bargaining); id. § 158 (catalogue of unfair labor practices by employers and unions);
see also infra note 9 (discussion of employer activities constituting unfair labor practices); infra
note 10 (discussion of union activities constituting unfiir labor practices).
4. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56 (1982) (creation of National Labor Relations Board). Section
3 of the NLRA provides for a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as an agency of the
federal government to govern the field of labor relations. Id. § 153(a). The NLRB consists of
two principal components, the five member Board and the General Counsel of the Board. See
generally Farmer, Problemsof OrganizationandAdministration of the NationalLaborRelations
Board, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 353, 357-60 (1960) (discussion of roles played by Board and
General Counsel). The five member Board of the NLRB regulates and conducts union representation elections and adjudicates unfair labor practice cases. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-60. The five NLRB
members serve staggered terms of five years each. Id. § 153(a). Congress empowered the President, upon the expiration of a member's term, to reappoirt the incumbent member or to appoint
a replacement subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. §§ 153(a), 154(a). The NLRA
also provides for the President, with the confirmation of the Senate, to appoint a General Counsel
of the Board to supervise the investigative and prosecutorial staffs of the NLRB. Id. § 153(d).
The NLRB operates over thirty regional offices throughout the United States and both the Board
and the General Counsel have delegated substantial authority to the regional directors administering
these offices. See R. GoAitNa, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 7 (1976) (NLRB regional offices conduct most daily business of Board and General Counsel). The Board delegates to the regional
directors only the authority to conduct and certify representation elections. See id. (regional directors
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Congress empowered to adjudicate and prosecute complaints of unfair labor
practices. 5 As originally enacted, section 7 of the NLRA specifically recognized
the employees' right to organize, affiliate with, or aid labor unions. 6 In 1947
Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, 7 which amended section 7 of the NLRA
by recognizing the employees' corresponding right to refrain from union
activity.8 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA declares that any interference by an
employer with an employee's rights under section 7 of the Act constitutes an
unfair labor practice. 9 Section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA deems any interference
by a union with an employee's section 7 rights an unfair labor practice.'"
generally conduct Board's routine election supervision functions). The Board, however, delegates
substantial adjudicative authority in unfair labor practice cases to administrative law judges. Id.
at 8-9.
5. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160-62 (1982) (Congress vested in NLRB power to investigate and
prevent unfair labor practices). Congress empowered the NLRB to investigate, prosecute, and
adjudicate claims of unfair labor practices. Id. The NLRB General Counsel exercises the investigative
and prosecutorial powers, while the five members of the Board enjoy sole control of the adjudicative function. See id. § 153(d) (General Counsel shall have final authority over investigation of charges and issuance and prosecution of complaints in unfair labor practice cases); id.
§ 160(a), (c) (Board shall have power upon record and findings of fact to issue orders preventing
and remedying unfair labor practices).
6. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982)).
7. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
8. Id., tit. I, § 1, 61 Stat. at 140 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982)). In enacting
the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress formally declared that the Act's purpose was to define the rights
of employers, employees, and labor organizations and to ensure that each respects the rights
of the others. Id. The principle purpose of the provisions amending the NLRA is the balancing
of the NLRA to recognize the potential for abuse of employee rights by labor organizations as
well as by management. See H.R. RP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (amendments
to NLRA are designed to make NLRA "two-sided"), reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1135, 1136.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982). Section 8 of the NLRA codifies various activities that Congress has deemed unfair labor practices. Id. Subsection (a) of § 8 outlines five unfair labor practices by employers. Id. § 158(a)(1)-(5). Section 8(a)(1) forbids employers from interfering with
employees' rights under § 7 of the NLRA. Id. § 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(2) prohibits employers
from dominating or interfering with a labor union. Id. § 158(a)(2). Section 8(a)(3) prohibits
employers from discriminating among employees on the basis of union membership. Id. § 158(a)(3).
Section 8(a)(4) forbids employers from discriminating against employees who file complaints with
the NLRB or cooperate in NLRB investigations and hearings. Id. § 158(a)(4). Section 8(a)(5)
prohibits an employer from refusing to bargain collectively with his employees. Id. § 8(a)(5).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982). Subsection (b) of § 8 of the NLRA codifies seven unfair
union labor practices. Id. § 158(b)(1)-(7). Section 8(b)(1) forbids unions from restraining or coercing either employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights or employers in the selection of bargaining
representatives. Id. § 158(b)(1)(A)-(B). Section 8(b)(2) prohibits unions from encouraging employers
to discriminate among employees on the basis of union membership. Id. § 158(b)(2). Section
8(b)(3) prohibits unions from refusing in bad faith to bargain. Id. § 158(b)(3). Section 8(b)(4)
outlaws secondary striking. Id. § 158(b)(4). Section 8(b)(5) forbids unions from charging excessive
or discriminatory membership fees. Id. § 158(b)(5). Section 8(b)(6) prohibits unions from exacting unearned money from employers. Id. § 158(b)(6). Section 8(b)(7) forbids unions from picketing
illegally. Id. § 158(b)(7).
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Although interference by an employer with an employee's option to participate in or to refrain from participating in union activity is generally unlawful,
the NLRB never has defined clearly the extent of interference that constitutes
an unfair labor practice.I In recent years the NLRB repeatedly has considered
whether the contractual granting of superseniority to union officers unlawful2
ly interferes with an employee's rights under section 7 of the NLRA.'
Superseniority clauses are common features in American collective bargaining
agreements. 3 Under a standard superseniority clause, an employer agrees to
treat certain employees as the most senior employees in the organizational
unit, regardless of the actual length of tenure of these employees. 4 Since most
collective bargaining agreements assign priority in layoff, recall, shift selection, and similar matters at least partly on the basis of seniority, the contractual granting of superseniority to an employee favors the beneficiary of the
clause over his peers." The parties to an employment contract may include
superseniority clauses in the contract for any of several reasons.' 6 For example, an employer may wish to reward highly skilled or especially efficient
11. See Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, slip op. at 10, 112 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1361, 1364 (Mar. 7, 1983) (grant of job retention superseniority to union officer not performing steward functions constituted unfair labor practice), enforced sub nom., Local 900,
Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dairylea
Cooperative, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 658 (1975) (grant of superseniority to union steward for
purposes other than job retention constituted unfair labor practice), enforced sub nom. NLRB
v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Dairylea
219 N.L.R.B. at 658 (grant of job retention superseniority to union steward would not constitute
unfair labor practice).
12. See, e.g., Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, slip op. at 10, 112 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1361, 1364 (Mar. 7, 1983) (grant of superseniority to union officer performing no "stewardtype" function was unlawful), enforced sub noma., Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers
of Am., Local 623 (Limpco Mfg., Inc.), 230 N.L.R.B. 406, 408 (1977) (grant of superseniority
to union officers was presumptively valid), review denied sub nom. D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d
820 (3d Cir. 1978); Dairylea Cooperative, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 658 (1975) (grant to stewards
of superseniority for purposes other than layoff and recall was presumptively invalid), enforced
sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976);
see also supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussion of employee rights under NLRA § 7).
13. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2095,
CHRACTERISTICS OF MAJOR Co.EcTrv BARGAINNG AGREEMENTS, JANUARY 1, 1980, at 97 (1981).

In a 1980 study of 1,550 major collective bargaining agreements the Bureau of Labor Statistics
found that over 40% of the agreements, each covering 1,000 workers or more, contained a clause
providing superseniority for union officials. Id.; see also Wortman, Superseniority-Myth or Reality?,
18 LAB. L.J. 195, 198 (1967). In a survey of 100 of the 500 largest industrial corporations in
the United States in 1964, Professor Wortman found that 73% of companies responding with
usable results admitted having superseniority clauses in their collective bargaining contracts. Id.

14. See Note, Superseniority: LatitudesandLimitations, 49 U. CQN. L. REv. 832, 832 (1980)
(definition and general discussion of superseniority) [hereinafter cited as Latitudes]; Note,
Superseniority: Post-DairyleaDevelopments, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 499, 499 (1979) (same)
[hereinafter cited as Superseniority]; see also Wortman, supra note 13, at 196-97 (examples of
superseniority clauses).

15. See Note, Latitudes, supra note 14, at 832 (superseniority disadvantages senior employees
not in beneficiary class).
16. See infra notes 17, 21-23 and accompanying text (discussion of management and union
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employees with the benefit of superseniority.' 7 Frequently, however,
superseniority clauses designate union officers and shop stewards,' 8 the union's
on-the-job contract adminstration and grievance processing representatives,
as members of the beneficiary class.' 9
Unions may insist upon superseniority for officers and stewards for several
reasons.2" First, superseniority clauses ensure the continued presence of union
representatives on the job site.2 ' Second, the clauses provide a measure of
job security for employee advocates who might otherwise fear antagonizing
management. 22 Third, the benefits that superseniority clauses confer act as
incentives for qualified candidates to seek union office. 3 Parties challenging
clauses granting superseniority to union officiers and shop stewards argue that
the clauses actually encourage union activism since a union would be unlikely
to elect or appoint an indifferent union member to a stewardship or any important union office. 21 Opponents of union officer superseniority contend that
since only activist union members can become officers, the clauses encourage
union involvement by rewarding union activists with benefits unavailable to
motives for including superseniority clauses in collective bargaining agreements).
17. See Wortman, supra note 13, at 197 (management may use superseniority clauses to
insulate highly skilled employees from layoff).
18. See Snow & Abramson, The Dual Role of the Union Steward: A Problem in LaborManagement Relations, 33 SYRAcusE L. REv. 795, 795 n.1 (1982) (explanation of shop steward's
role). The union steward, or shop steward, is generally an employee elected or appointed by
a union to present employee grievances to an employer and to monitor the employer's compliance
with the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 795 & n.1.
19. See, e.g., Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.H. No. 84, slip op. at 3 n.4, 112
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1361, 1362 (1983) (superseniority clause favoring union president, vice president, chief stewards, negotiating committee members, financial secretary-treasurer, recording
secretary, and leave of absence committee members was illegal), enforced sub nom., Local 900,
Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984); McQuayNorris, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B 1397, 1399 (1981) (contract clause granting superseniority to local union
bargaining committee members and executive officers was unlawful as applied to union guide
and union trustee); Allied Indus. Workers of Am. (Allen Group, Inc.), 236 N.L.R.B. 1368, 1368-70
(1978) (superseniority clause favoring union president, vice-president, bargaining committee
members, chief steward, financial secretary, recording secretary, executive board members at large,
and stewards was enforceable); see also Wortman, supra note 13, at 198. In a study of major
corporation and union collective bargaining contracts, Professor Wortman found that 80% of
the contracts containing superseniority clauses favored union officers and stewards among the
beneficiary class. Id.
20. See Wortman, supra note 13, at 195 (discussion of reasons for union interest in superseniority provisions).
21. See id. (unions may desire superseniority clauses to retain stewards on job site).
22. See id. (unions may desire superseniority clause to insulate officers from employer
intimidation).
23. See American Can Co. (American Can II), 244 N.L.R.B. 736, 740 (1979) (Fanning
and Truesdale, dissenting) (superseniority provisions favoring union officers reward and encourage
service in union offices to benefit of all union members), enforced, 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981).
24. See Note, Superseniority,supra note 14, at 499 (superseniority clauses favoring union
officials raise questions of unfair labor practices). Employees objecting to union officer superseniority sometimes claim that employers and unions maintaining such superseniority clauses violate
§ 8(a)(1) and (3), and § 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by interfering with employees' rights to be active or
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inactive union members and non-union workers.25 An employee's rights under
section 7 of the NLRA include the right to be an inactive union member if
the employee so chooses.2 6 Opponents of superseniority, therefore, conclude
that the inclusion of a superseniority clause in an employment contract interferes with employees' section 7 rights if the clause includes union officers
27
and shop stewards within the beneficiary class.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an employee's rights
under section 7 of the NLRA encompass more than the freedom to join or
29
2
to abstain from joining a labor union. " In Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,
the Court noted that an employee's section 7 rights are sweeping and include
the right to join a union, to be an active or inactive member, or to refrain
inactive union members and by discriminating against inactive union members for union-related
reasons. See Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, slip. op. at 14-15, 112 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1361, 1365 (1983) (employer and union violated § 8(a)(1) and (3), and § 8(b)(1)(A) and
(2) of NLRA by maintaining superseniority clause benefitting union recording secretary and
secretary-treasurer), enforcedsub nom., Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers
v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text
(discussion of NLRB's Gulton decision); see also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussion
of employer and union unfair labor practices under NLRA § 8).
25. See Dairylea Cooperative, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 657 (1975) (General Counsel charged
that superseniority clause unlawfully encouraged union activism by rewarding union stewards
since only activist union members could realistically hope to win appointment as steward), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir.
1976); cf. Wortman, supra note 13, at 197 (increased security afforded by superseniority might
encourage less senior employees to seek superseniority).
26. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954) (employees' § 7 rights
include right to be indifferent union member if employee so chooses). In Radio Officers' Union,
the Supreme Court considered the extent of the membership interest protected by § 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA which forbids employers from discriminating among employees on the basis of union
membership and by § 8(b)(2) of the NLRA which prohibits unions from encouraging or coercing
employers to violate NLRA § 8(a)(3). Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1982) (codification
of employer and union unfair labor practices alleged in Radio Officers' Union); see also notes
9-10 and accompanying text (discussion of employer and union unfair labor practices under §
8 of NLRA). The interests that NLRA § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2) protect, however, are identical
to the interests protected by § 8(a)(1) and § 8(b)(l)(A) and codified in NLRA § 7 because NLRA
§ 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2) merely define a particular class of activities that constitute violations of
§ 8(a)(1) and § 8(b)(1)(A). See R. GoRmANs,
supra note 4, at 152 (all unfair labor practices under
NLRA § 8 derive from NLRA § 8(a)(1) and § 8(b)(1)(A)); 29 U.S.C. § 157 (codification of employee
rights under NLRA § 7); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)(A), (2) (codification of employer and
union unfair labor practices under NLRA § 8).
27. See Dairylea Cooperative, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 657 (1975) (General Counsel argued
that superseniority provision favoring union stewards interfered with employees' NLRA § 7 rights
by rewarding activist union members), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy
Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
28. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954) (§ 7 protects employees'
right to participate as actively in union as employees choose in addition to employees' right to
join or abstain from joining union); supra note 26 (Supreme Court's discussion of membership
interest under NLRA § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2) in Radio Officers' Union implicitly expands employee
rights under NLRA § 7 by allowing employees to be indifferent union members if the employees
so choose); see also supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussion of employee rights under
§ 7 of NLRA).
29. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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from joining a union. 31 Under the rule in Radio Officers' Union that section
7 of the NLRA protects an employee's right to be as active or inactive in
a union as the employee chooses, the section 8 prohibitions of employer and
union interference with employees' section 7 rights forbid not only efforts

to encourage or discourage union membership but also efforts to encourage
or discourage more active involvement in union affairs by union members.3
Under a strict reading of Radio Officers' Union, any employment contract
clause assigning important job benefits to a union officer or steward on the

basis of the individual's position in the union seemingly would violate section2

8 of the NLRA by encouraging employees to become active union members.
The NLRB and even the Supreme Court, however, have recognized in some
cases the appropriateness of according special treatment, perhaps including

superseniority, to a union official on account33of the union official's unique

role in securing the rights of all employees.
In AeronauticalIndustrialDistrictLodge 727 v. Campbell,3" the Supreme

Court first considered the validity of a contract clause granting superseniority
to union officials. 35 In Campbell, three veterans of the United States military

challenged a clause granting superseniority to union chairmen. 36 Each of the
30. Id. at 40; see supra note 26 (Radio Officers' Union Court's definition of membership
under NLRA § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2) implicitly expands employees' NLRA § 7 rights); see also
supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussion of employee rights codified by NLRA § 7).
31. See 347 U.S. at 40 (§ 7 rights include right to be as active or inactive in union as employee
chooses); supranote 26 (Court's discussion in Radio Officers' Union of union membership under
NLRA § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2) implicitly expands employee rights under NLRA § 7).
32. Cf.Wortman, supra note 13, at 197 (less senior employees actively might seek superseniority to enhance job security). Professor Wortman suggests that young or new employees actively
might seek to qualify for superseniority benefits to assure themselves of job security. Id. Since
election or appointment to union office is a prerequisite to qualification for union officer
superseniority, and since active union involvement is often a prerequisite to election or appointment to union office, clauses granting superseniority to union officers may tend to encourage
employees with little temporal seniority to become more active union members than they otherwise would choose to be. See id.; supranotes 24-25 and accompanying text (superseniority provisions favoring union officers may encourage union activism by rewarding active union members).
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB suggests that employees' § 7 rights protects employees from
coercion by an employer or union to become more active union members. 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
Since any employer or union interference with employees' § 7 rights constitutes a violation of
§ 8 of the NLRA, unions and employers may violate § 8 by maintaining union officer superseniority
clauses in collective bargaining agreements. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 8(a)(1), 8(B)(1)(A) (1982) (unlawful
for employer or union to interfere with employees' § 7 rights).
33. See, e.g., Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 527 (1949)
(special role of union chairmen in collective bargaining process warranted special treatment with
respect to seniority); Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, slip op. at 10, 112 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1361, 1364 (1983) (steward's role in plant level contract administration justifies superseniority
despite potential discriminatory effect of superseniority), enforced sub nom., Local 900, Int'l
Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dairylea
Cooperative, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 658 (1975) (special role of steward in contract administration process justifies limited superseniority benefits for union stewards), enforcedsub nom. NLRB
v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
34. 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
35. Id. at 528.
36. Id. at 522. In AeronauticalIndus. Dist.Lodge 727 v. Campbell, the Court treated "union
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three Campbell plaintiffs worked for Lockheed Aircraft Corporation before
entering the armed forces during World War II, and each of the plaintiffs

returned to work at Lockheed after his discharge from the service.

7

In 1946

Lockheed temporarily laid off a number of workers, including the plaintiffs,
because the company experienced a lull in business.3 8 Although Lockheed based

its layoff decisions primarily on seniority, which Lockheed adjusted to include time that employees served in the military, the company retained several

union chairmen with less accrued seniority than the plaintiffs pursuant to a
superseniority clause in the collective bargaining agreement. 39 The plaintiffs
charged that the superseniority clause infringed their right under section 8 of

the Selective Service Act40 to reinstatement without loss of seniority after an
honorable discharge from the service. 4 ' The Campbell plaintiffs, however, made
no claim that Lockheed or the union had violated section 8 of the NLRA
by maintaining and enforcing the superseniority clause. 2 The Supreme Court

noted that section 8 of the Selective Service Act requires only that an employer
accord veterans the same seniority the veterans would have enjoyed if their
tenure with the employer had not been interrupted by military service. 3 The
Campbell Court concluded that the Selective Service Act permits an employer

to make layoff decisions on a basis other than temporal seniority44 as long
as the employer decides on a reasonable basis that does not penalize veterans
for their intervening military service.41 The Court noted that Lockheed had
not denied the plaintiffs any temporal seniority accrued under the Selective

Service Act. 6 The Court further noted that the contract clause granting
superseniority to union chairmen was not unreasonable since the clause served
a legitimate employer and employee interest in maintaining continuity among

chairman" as being essentially synonymous with "shop steward." See id. at 527 (continuity in
office of "shop stewards or union chairmen" is essential to effective collective bargaining).
37. Id. at 522.
38. Id. at 524.

39. Id. The superseniority clause at issue in Campbell provided that in the event of a layoff,
Lockheed would treat union chairmen who had attained a minimal level of seniority as the unit's
most senior employees during their tenure as chairmen. Id. at 523 n.2.
40. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 8, ch. 720, § 8,54 Stat. 885, 890 (expired

1947).
41. 337 U.S. at 524. Section 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provided
that individuals inducted into the armed forces during the period covered by the Act would be
entitled to return to their former employment without loss of seniority upon their honorable
discharge from the service. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 8, ch. 720, § 8, 54
Stat. 885, 890 (expired 1947). The Act provided specifically that employers should treat returning
veterans as if the veterans had been on furlough or leave of absence during the time the veterans
served in the military. Id.
42. See 337 U.S. at 522-24 (plaintiff in Campbellalleged that superseniority provision interfered with plaintiff's rights as veteran under Selective Training and Service Act § 8).
43. Id. at 525-26.

44. Id. at 527. The Campbell Court noted that the actual length of service with an employer
need not be the only basis for determining seniority. Id.
45. Id. at 527-28.
46. Id.
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the employees' grievance processing representatives. 47 The Campbell Court,
therefore, held that Lockheed had not violated section 8 of the Selective Service Act in honoring the superseniority clause. 4 8 Although the Supreme Court
in Campbell recognized that the granting of superseniority to certain union

officials may serve legitimate employee interests, the Court never reached the

49
issue whether such a grant would violate section 8 of the NLRA.
The NLRB first considered the issue whether a contract clause favoring

certain union officials with superseniority violated section 8 of the NLRA in
Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.5" In Dairylea, Howard Rosengrandt, a driver
employed by Dairylea Cooperative, objected to a contract provision that
allowed Peter Daniels, a union steward with less temporal seniority at Dairylea,
to outbid Rosengrandt for a particularly desirable driving route." Rosengrandt
charged that the clause, giving the shop steward top seniority for all purposes,
violated Rosengrandt's section 7 rights by rewarding Daniels' more active in-

volvement in the union. 2 Rosengrandt accordingly alleged that in maintaining and enforcing the clause Dairylea had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)

of the NLRA13 and the Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Union had violated
sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA.5 4 In ruling on Rosengrandt's
complaint, the NLRB held that a clause granting stewards superseniority with
respect to layoff and recall could be lawful if such a clause ensured the continued presence of the union's on-the-job representatives at the plant site.',

47. Id. at 528-29.
48. Id. at 527-28.
49. See id. at 528-29 (provisions granting superseniority to union stewards may serve legitimate
employee interests).
50. 219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975), enforced sub nom., NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees,
Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976); see 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982) (NLRA § 8 prohibits unfair
labor practices); supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussion of employer and union unfair labor practices under NLRA § 8).
51. 219 N.L.R.B. at 657. In Dairylea Cooperative, Inc., the NLRB found that a union
steward earned roughly $14,000 in 9 months driving a route that the steward won only by exercising the superseniority granted to him on account of his union office. Id. The complainant, who
would have received the steward's route but for the supersenioity provision in the Dairylea contract, earned only $12,000 driving the company's next best route during the same period. Id.
52. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (codification of employee rights under § 7 of NLRA);
supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussion of history and provisions of NLRA § 7). In
addition to charging that Dairylea and the Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union had violated
NLRA § 8(a)(1) and § 8(b)(1)(A) by interfering with employees' rights under § 7 of the NLRA,
the complainant in Dairylea also charged that the respondent employer had violated § 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA by discriminating on the basis of union membership and that the respondent union
had violated § 8(b)(2) by encouraging the respondent employer to discriminate on the basis of
union membership. 219 N.L.R.B. at 657; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)(A), (2) (1982)
(codification of employer and union unfair labor practices alleged in Dairylea);supra notes 9-10
(discussion of employer and union unfair labor practices under NLRA § 8).
53. 219 N.L.R.B. at 657; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1982) (employer unfair trade practices); supra note 9 (discussion of employer unfair trade practices under § 8(a) of NLRA).
54. 219 N.L.R.B. at 657; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), (2) (1982) (union unfair labor practices); supra note 10 (discussion of union unfair labor practices under NLRA § 8(b)).
55. 219 N.L.R.B. at 658. In ruling that a superseniority clause ensuring the continued presence
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The NLRB, however, recognized that superseniority clauses are inherently
discriminatory.", The NLRB, therefore, held that superseniority provisions

aimed at objectives other than ensuring that union officials will be the last
employees laid off and the first rehired are presumptively unlawful." Since
the NLRB found no adequate justification for the application of superseniority
clauses to route selection procedures, the NLRB held that Dairylea and the

Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Union had violated sections 8(a)(1) and
(3), and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the NLRA.58 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced the NLRB's order against the union
with little discussion of the merits of the NLRB's decision. 9 The Second Circuit noted only that the NLRB's inference that the union would have been
unlikely to select an indifferent union member to serve as a steward was a
reasonable inference since the selection of stewards was solely within the union's
discretion and the stewards were to represent the union's interests before the
employer.6 The Second Circuit accordingly held that the NLRB's conclusion
that steward superseniority provisions tend to discriminate against inactive

union members was not subject to reversal. 6' Although the NLRB's Dairylea
decision clearly enunciated a policy that the permissible scope of superseniority
was not unlimited, the Board's decision left open the question of
precisely
6 2
which union officials lawfully could be accorded superseniority.
of a union steward on the job site could be lawful, the NLRB in Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.
noted that the steward's presence on the job site benefited all employees in the bargaining unit
and that this collective benefit outweighed any discrimination resulting from the application of
the clause in particular instances. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The NLRB noted in Dairylea that a party asserting the legality of a clause granting
superseniority to union officials for purposes other than layoff and rehire would bear the burden
of proving that the benefits of the provision outweighed any discriminatory effects. Id.
58. Id. at 659; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)(A), (2) (1982) (codification of employer
and union unfair labor practices); supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussion of NLRA
§ 8 unfair labor practices).
59. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1167 (2d Cir.
1976). In NLRB v. Milk Drivers& DairyEmployees, Local 338, the NLRB brought enforcement
proceedings only against the respondent union since the employer in Dairyleahad promptly complied with the NLRB's ruling. Id. at 1164.
60. Id. at 1165-66. In Milk Drivers, the Second Circuit expressly deferred to the NLRB's
expertise in the field of labor relations. Id. at 1165 n.5. The Milk Drivers court suggested that
courts should overturn factual conclusions of the NLRB only when the NLRB's conclusion has
no rational basis in the record. Id. at 1165.
61. Id. at 1165-66. The Second Circuit enforced the NLRB's order in Dairylea without
ever considering whether the respondent union had violated NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) by intefering
with the complainant's rights under § 7 of the NLRA. Id. at 1165 n.3. The Second Circuit never
reached the § 8(b)(1)(A) question because the court determined that the NLRB had correctly
found the union to have violated § 8(b)(2) of the NLRA by encouraging Dairylea to discriminate
among its employees on the basis of union memberhsip. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982)
(union interference with employees' rights under NLRA § 7 shall constitute unfair labor practice); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982) (union encouragement of employer discrimination on basis
of union membership shall constitute unfair labor practice); see also notes 6-8 and accompanying
text (discussion of employee rights under NLRA § 7).
62. See 219 N.L.R.B. at 659 (contract clause granting union stewards superseniority with
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In 1977, two years after Dairylea,the NLRB considered for the first time
whether a clause granting layoff and recall superseniority to union officers
not performing steward functions would infringe unlawfully upon the section
7 rights of other employees. 63 In United ElectricalRadio and Machine Workers
6
of America, Local 623 (Limpco Manufacturing, Inc.), " Anna D'Amico, a
factory worker, complained that her employer, Limpco Manufacturing, had

laid her off while retaining a union recording secretary 65 with less temporal

seniority pursuant to a superseniority clause in a collective bargaining agreement between Limpco and Limpco's employees.66 Patricia Jenkins, the union

recording secretary, had virtually no involvement with on-the-job contract administration or grievance processing. 67 Furthermore, after an initial hearing,
an administrative law judge concluded that any involvement Jenkins may have
had with such matters was on a purely voluntary basis. 68 The NLRB General
Counsel prosecuting D'Amico's complaint argued that under Dairylea the ap-

plication of a superseniority clause to a union officer is presumptively lawful
only when the officer performs steward functions and the superseniority is
limited to layoff and recall. 69 The General Counsel contended that since Jenkins'
position as recording secretary involved no steward duties, the application of
70
the clause to Jenkins was presumptively invalid under the rule in Dairylea.
The General Counsel further argued that the respondents had failed to meet
respect to terms and conditions of employment other than layoff and recall was unlawful).
63. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., Local 623 (Limpco Mfg., Inc.),
230 N.L.R.B. 406, 408 (1977) (superseniority clause favoring union recording secretary was lawful
since respondents proved that recording secretary's responsibilities related directly to representation of employees in bargaining unit), review denied sub nom., D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d
820 (3d Cir. 1978); see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (workers shall have right to participate or refrain
from participating in union activity); supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussion of history
and substance of NLRA § 7).
64. 230 N.L.R.B. 406 (1977), review denied sub nom., D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820
(3d Cir. 1978).
65. See id. at 411. The duties of the local recording secretary in Limpco as outlined in
the constitution and bylaws of local 623 of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
consisted of keeping records of local meetings and local executive board meetings and of handling the local's correspondence. Id.
66. Id. at 406. The superseniority clause at issue in Limpco provided that union officers
and stewards would receive the highest seniority preference in the event of a layoff, unless the
union officials were incapable of performing the remaining work. Id. at 406 n.3.
67. See supra note 65 (discussion of official duties of recording secretary in Limpco as
defined in constitution and bylaws of United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America).
68. 230 N.L.R.B. at 411 (initial decision of administrative law judge in Limpco).
69. Id. at 406; see Dairylea Cooperative, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 659 (1975) (contract clause
granting union steward superseniority with respect to terms and conditions of employment other
than layoff and recall was unlawful), enforcedsub nom., NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees,
Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976); see also notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussion
of Dairylea).
70. 230 N.L.R.B. at 406; see Dairylea Cooperative, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 658 (1975)
(steward superseniority provisions limited to layoff and recall are lawful because such provisions
promote contract administration at plant level), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers &
Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976); see also notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussion of NLRB's reasoning and holding in Dairylea).
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their burden of proving that the application of the clause was appropriate
in Jenkins' case. 7' Although the administrative law judge accepted the General
Counsel's arguments and found the application of the superseniority clause
to Jenkins unlawful," the NLRB reversed the administrative law judge's initial decision on appeal.13 The NLRB majority held that the employees' overriding interest in maintaining effective contract administration through continuity of union representation extends beyond the plant level and includes
an interest in maintaining an effective operating local. 174 The NLRB found
that when an officer's role is related directly to the representation of unit
employees, any grant of layoff and recall superseniority to the officer is
presumptively lawful. 7 The NLRB, therefore, held that the application of the
superseniority clause in the Limpco contract to Jenkins did not violate section
8 of the NLRA because Jenkins' duties as recording secretary directly benefited
76
all of Limpco's union employees by promoting the stability of the union local.
D'Amico petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
77
to review the NLRB's decision and order in the Limpco case.
In 1978, the Third Circuit denied D'Amico's petition to review the NLRB's
Limpco decision in D'Amico v. NLRB. 7 1 In denying D'Amico's petition,
however, the court of appeals placed a very narrow construction on the NLRB's
Limpco opinion."9 The Third Circuit read the NLRB's decision as placing the
burden of proof upon the respondent union to show that the contract justifiably
accorded superseniority to the union recording secretary whose official duties
did not relate to the collective bargaining process. 0 Although the court noted
that Jenkins' official job description as recording secretary was insufficient
to support the application of the contract's superseniority clause to Jenkins,
the Third Circuit held that the NLRB reasonably was entitled to infer that
Jenkins' implied duties were of a kind entitling Jenkins to the benefit of
71. 230 N.L.R.B. at 406.
72. Id. at 412 (administrative law judge's initial decision in Limpco).
73. Id. at 406-07.
74. Id. at 407-08. The NLRB majority in Limpco construed the Supreme Court's decision
in AeronauticalIndus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell as holding that a superseniority clause providing job security for any individual representing or helping to represent bargaining unit employees
is lawful. Id. at 407 n.8; see Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521,
527 (1949) (special role of union chairmen in collective bargaining process warranted special treatment with respect to seniority); see also supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text (discussion
of Campbell). The Limpco majority therefore held that superseniority clauses could be lawful
as applied to union officials other than stewards and officers performing steward functions. Id.
at 407-08, 407 n.8.
75. 230 N.L.R.B. at 408.
76. Id.
77. See D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820, 826 (3d Cir. 1978) (denying complainant's peti-

tion for review of NLRB's decision and order in Limpco).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 824-25. In D'Amico, the Third Circuit read the NLRB's Limpco decision as holding
only that a party asserting the validity of a superseniority clause which favors union officials
who perform no steward functions is entitled to show some other reason why the provision should
be upheld. Id.

80. Id. at 825.
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superseniority." Until the Third Circuit's August 1978 opinion in D'Amico,
the NLRB continued to give great deference to parties contracting for union
officer superseniority.82 The NLRB's lenient attitude toward superseniority
clauses favoring union officers reached its zenith several months before the
Third Circuit's D'Amico decision when the NLRB issued its first opinion in
American Can Company (American Can 1).11
In American Can I, the NLRB held that a layoff and recall superseniority
clause was lawful as applied to two union trustees and a union guard."' In
American Can I, two American Can Company employees, Stanley and Donald
Egan, objected to their layoff by the company." The Egans complained that
American Can Company and the United Steelworkers of America had violated
section 8 of the NLRA by invoking a superseniority clause in the collective
bargaining agreement to retain three union officers with less temporal seniority
than the Egans."I In challenging the application of the clause to the three officers, two union trustees and a union guard, the General Counsel introduced
into evidence the respondent union's constitution which included job descriptions for the offices of trustee and guard.87 The General Counsel conceded
that the superseniority clause was lawful on its face but argued that the application of the clause to the guard and the trustees was unlawful because
the offices of guard and trustee as described in the union constitution did

81. Id. The Third Circuit noted in D'Amico that the union recording secretary employed
by Limpco informally assisted stewards in writing and processing grievances and advised stewards
on matters of contract interpretation. Id. at 826. The D'Amico court further noted that the recording secretary attended shop meetings and assisted in devising the union's bargaining strategy.
Id. The Third Circuit concluded that the NLRB reasonably could have inferred that these tasks
were implied responsibilities of the recording secretary's office. Id.
82. See, e.g., American Can Co. (American Can I), 235 N.L.R.B. 704, 704-05 (1978) (application of superseniority clause to union officers was presumptively valid), rev'd on rehearing,
244 N.L.R.B. 736 (1979), enforced, 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981); Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.L.R.B.
1128, 1129 (1977) (same); Expedient Services, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 938, 940 (1977) (application
of superseniority clause to union officers whose responsibilities related directly to representation
of bargaining unit interests was valid).
83. 235 N.L.R.B. 704, 704-05 (1978) (superseniority provision favoring union officials was
presumptively lawful and complainant did not overcome presumption by showing that official
duties of beneficiary, as outlined in job description, were unrelated to advancement of bargaining
unit interests), rev'd on rehearing,244 N.L.R.B. 736 (1979), enforced, 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981).
84. Id. at 704-05. According to the formal job descriptions of the trustees and the guard
in American Can I, the trustees' duties were limited to managing the union hall and overseeing
union property and the guard's only duty was to act as a sort of sergeant at arms during union
meetings. Id. at 704.
85. d. at 705 (administrative law judges initial decision in American Can 1).
86. Id. The complainants in American Can I, charged that the respondent employer had
violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA and that the respondent union had violated § 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) of the NLRA when the union and the employer invoked the superseniority clause to
retain union officers with less seniority than the complainants. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1),
(3), (b)(1)(A), (2) (1982) (codification of unfair labor practices alleged in American Can 1); see
also supra notes 9-10 (discussion of employer and union unfair labor practices under NLRA § 8).
87. 235 N.L.R.B. at 704; see supra note 84 (discussion of duties of trustee and guard in
American Can 1).
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not involve any contract administration duties.8 8 The NLRB dismissed the
Egans' complaint, holding that the application of a layoff and recall
superseniority clause to any union officer is presumptively valid.89 the NLRB
further held that the General Counsel had not discharged its burden of proof
merely by showing that the officers' job descriptions did not require any con-

tract administration duties.90 The majority's opinion in American Can I suggested that the NLRB would give deference to a union's determination of which

officers assist the union in effectively representing the bargaining unit and
that the Board would not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of
a union absent proof that the union's decision was unwarranted. 9' The Egans
appealed the NLRB's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit in April, 1978.92 In September, 1978, after the Third Circuit's
D'Amico decision, the NLRB successfully petitioned the Tenth Circuit for
3
permission to reconsider the Board's decision in American Can L9
Upon reconsideration of the Egans' complaint in American Can II, 9" an
aggregate majority of the NLRB found that American Can Company and the
United Steelworkers of America unlawfully had invoked the superseniority

clause to retain two of the three union officers with shorter lengths of service
than the Egans. 9" In American Can 1I, the NLRB noted a distinction between

officers merely aiding in the representation of the employees in a bargaining
unit and officers actually furthering the administration of a collective bargaining
agreement.9 The NLRB majority stated that in light of the Third Circuit's
ruling in D'Amico, only officers actually furthering the administration of a
collective bargaining agreement lawfully could enjoy the benefit of

superseniority.9 Since the NLRB concluded that the union duties of the two
88. 235 N.L.R.B. at 707-08 (initial decision of administrative law judge in American Can
I discussing argument of General Counsel).
89. Id. at 705. In American Can 1, the NLRB relied upon the NLRB's decision in United
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., Local 623 (Limpco Mfg., Inc.) as authority for the proposition that provisions granting layoff and recall superseniority to union officers are presumptively lawful, regardless of the duties and responsibilities involved in the office. Id. at 704; see
Limpco, 230 N.L.R.B. 406 (1977), review denied sub nom., D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820
(3d Cir. 1978).
90. Id. at 704. In dismissing the complaint in American Can I, the NLRB gave no indication of what sort of evidentiary showing would satisfy the General Counsel's burden of proof
that a superseniority clause had been unlawfully applied to a union officer. Id. at 704-05.
91. 235 N.L.R.B. at 704-05.
92. See American Can Company (American Can II), 244 N.L.R.B. 736, 736 (1979) (NLRB's
discussion of procedural posture in American Can I1), enforced, 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981).
93. See id. (American Can I procedural facts as outlined by NLRB).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 738. In American Can 11 the NLRB found that although American Can Company had retained two union trustees while laying off other more senior employees, the company
had retained only one of the two trustees because of the trustee's office. Id. at 737. The NLRB
found that the company had retained the second trustee for reasons unrelated to the individual's
union office. Id. at 737 n.5.
96. Id. at 737.
97. Id. at 738 (respondent union and respondent employer in American Can H unlawfully
accorded superseniority to union guard and trustees, since neither officer represented employees
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trustees and the guard did not involve administration of the collective bargaining
agreement, the Board majority held that the application of the clause to the
trustees and the guard constituted a violation of section 8 of the NLRA. 98
Although a majority of the five NLRB members agreed in American Can
I1 that the application of the superseniority clause to one of the trustees and
the guard was unlawful, the three members of the majority offered differing
rationales in support of this conclusion.9 9 Members Jenkins and Penello stated
their view in a separate concurring opinion that union officer superseniority

is justified only when necessary to insure the continued presence at the job
site of the union's on-the-job contract administrators.10' Since the clause at
issue in the American Can cases accorded superseniority to all union officers
regardless of whether the officers performed any steward functions, Members
Jenkins and Penello would have found the clause unlawful on its face.10'

Member Murphy, the third member of the aggregate majority in American
Can II, stated her view in a separate concurrence that superseniority clauses
may be lawful not only as applied to union officials performing steward func-

tions, but also as applied to any union officer whose functions result in the
furtherance of the collective bargaining relationship.'

2

Member Murphy,

therefore, would have found the superseniority cause in the American Can
contract lawful on its face." 3 Additionally, under the approach enunciated
in grievance processing or administration of collective bargaining agreement); See D'Amico v.
NLRB, 582 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1978) (relied upon by NLRB in American Can 11).
98. Id. In American Can II, the NLRB found that the respondent employer had violated
NLRA § 8(a)(1) and (3) and that the respondent union had violated § 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the
NLRA by maintaining the superseniority clause at issue. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (B)(1)(A),
(2) (1982) (codification of employer and union unfair labor practices alleged in American Can
II); see also supra notes 9-10 (discussion of employer and union unfair labor practices under
NLRA § 8).
99. 244 N.L.R.B. at 737.
100. Id. at 739 (Jenkins & Penello, concurring). In a concurring opinion in American Can
11, Members Jenkins and Penello expressed the view that Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. established
a two part test for determining the legality of a superseniority clause favoring union officials.
Id. First, under Jenkins' and Penello's reading of Dairylea, the official must contribute to the
representation of employee interests. Id. Second, the official's union responsibilities must involve
primarily on-the-job activities. Id.; see Dairylea Cooperative, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 658 (1975)
(collective bargaining agreement lawfully may accord superseniority to union steward because
of stweard's special role as on-job contract administrator and grievance processor), enforcedsub
nom., NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976); see
also supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussion of Dairylea case).
101. 244 N.L.R.B. at 739 (Jenkins & Penello, concurring). In addition to finding the
superseniority clause in American Can II unlawful on its face, Members Jenkins and Penello
indicated that in their view, American Can Company had unlawfully applied the provision to
the trustee and the guard at issue since the offices of union trustee and guard did not involve
primarily on-the-job responsibilities. Id.
102. Id. at 740 (Murphy, concurring). Under the standard outlined by Member Murphy in
her separate concurrence in American Can II, any clause granting job retention superseniority
to a union officer apparently would be presumptively lawful. Id.
103. Id. (Murphy, concurring). Since the superseniority clause at issue in American Can
1I applied only to union local officers and grievance processors, Member Murphy stated in her
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by Member Murphy, the NLRB General Counsel would bear the burden of
14
showing that any such clause was applied unlawfully to a particular officer.

In American Can 11, Member Murphy concluded that the General Counsel
had met its burden of proving that the union improperly applied the
superseniority clause to the guard and the steward. 05 Member Murphy therefore

joined Members Jenkins and Penello in holding that American Can Company
and the United Steelworkers union had violated section 8 of the NLRA.106
In enforcing the NLRB's order against the respondent company, the Tenth
Circuit expressed no explicit preference between the two conflicting rationales
10 7
of the aggregate majority.

In Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc.,108 the NLRB settled the question of which

of the views of the aggregate majority in American Can 11 would prevail as
the ultimate Board policy on union officer superseniority.' 09 In Gulton, William
Schock, an employee at Gulton Electro-Voice's Buchanan, Michigan plant,

separate concurring opinion in the case that she would have found the provision lawful on its
face. Id.
104. Id. (Murphy, concurring). Under Member Murphy's standard in American Can II, the
General Counsel would meet his initial burden of proving that a superseniority provision was
unlawfully applied to a particular union officer if the General Counsel proved that the officer's
duties did not contribute meaningfully to the implementation of the union's contract. Id.
105. Id. (Murphy, concurring). In American Can II, Member Murphy concluded that the
General Counsel had met his initial burden of proving that the guard's and one of the trustees'
duties were not reasonably related to the implementation of the collective bargaining agreement
when the General Counsel offered in evidence the official job descriptions of the trustee and
the guard. Id.; see supranote 84 (discussion of trustee's and guard's job descriptions in American
Can cases). Member Murphy further concluded that the respondents failed to rebut the General
Counsel's evidence with any proof that the guard or the trustee actually furthered the implementation of the contract. 244 N.L.R.B. at 740.
106. 244 N.L.R.B. at 740 (Murphy, concurring). Members Fanning and Truesdale dissented
from the NLRB's decision in American Can 1H. Id. (Fanning & Truesdale, dissenting). Members
Fanning and Truesdale stood by the NLRB's earlier position in American Can I that provisions
granting superseniority to union officers are presumptively lawful and that evidence of the officers' official job descriptions is inadequate to overcome the presumption of legality. Id.; see
American Can Co. (American Can I), 235 N.L.R.B. 704, 704 (1977) (application of superseniority clause to union officers was presumptively lawful and evidence of officer's official job descriptions did not overcome presumption), rev'd on rehearing, 244 N.L.R.B. 736 (1979), enforced,
658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981); see also supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussion
of NLRB's holding in American Can 1).
107. NLRB v. American Can Co., 658 F.2d 746, 753 (10th Cir. 1981). In American Can,
the Tenth Circuit reviewed the NLRB's decision in American Can I1 under the substantial evidence
standard of judicial review. Id. at 752-53; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(E) (1982) (reviewing court shall set aside agency findings unsupported by substantial evidence
on record). Since the Tenth Circuit concluded that the NLRB's decision and order were supported by substantial evidence, the court found no need to establish any rule for determining
the legality of superseniority clauses favoring union officers. 658 F.2d at 753. The Tenth Circuit,
however, did suggest that the party seeking enforcement of such a superseniority clause should
bear the burden of proving that the clause serves a justifiable purpose. Id. at 757.
108. 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1361 (Mar. 7, 1983), enforced sub nom.,
Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
109. See infra notes 114-17 (discussion of NLRB's holding in Gulton).
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objected when Gulton laid off Schock while retaining a union official with
less temporal seniority.I" After investigating Schock's complaint, the NLRB
General Counsel charged Gulton and the International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers with violating section 8 of the NLRA by main-

taining and enforcing a supersensiority clause in favor of certain ineligible
union officials."' Although Schock's initial complaint focused upon the reten-

tion of a union negotiating committee member, the General Counsel objected
to the superseniority clause only as applied to the union's recording secretary

and financial secretary-treasurer, neither of whom performed any steward
duties." 2 After the General Counsel's restructuring of the charge and after

the stipulations of the various parties, the NLRB in Gulton considered only
the narrow legal issue whether an employment contract lawfully may contain a provision granting superseniority in layoff and recall to union officials who perform no grievance processing or on-the-job contract administration functions."' Overruling the earlier NLRB decision in Limpco,
the NLRB held in Gulton that any grant of superseniority to union officers
who perform no steward functions violates section 8 of the NLRA by
discriminating among employees for union-related reasons." 4 In Gulton, the
NLRB echoed the view expressed by Members Jenkins and Penello in American
Can II that superseniority is justifiable as applied to union stewards only
because a steward must be present on the job to perform his union duties."'
Since the NLRB concluded that this rationale is inapplicable to officers who

110. Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., No. 7-CA-18952, slip op. at 4-5 & 5 n.4 (N.L.R.B. Div.
of Judges Jan. 7, 1982) (administrative law judge's initial decision in Gulton), rev'd, 266 N.L.R.B.
No. 84, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1361 (Mar. 7, 1983), enforced sub nom., Local 900, Int'l Union
of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
111. Id. at 5. In Gulton, the NLRB General Counsel specifically charged the respondent
union with violating NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) and the respondent employer with violating §
8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. Id. at I; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)(A), (2) (1982) (codification
of unfair labor practices alleged in Gulton); see also supra notes 9-10 (discussion of employer
and union unfair labor practices under NLRA § 8).
112. Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., No. 7-CA-18952, slip op. at 5 n.4 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges
Jan. 7, 1982) (administrative law judge's initial decision in Gulton), rev'd, 266 N.L.R.B. No.
84, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1361 (Mar. 7, 1983), enforced sub nom., Local 900, Int'l Union of
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The parties in Gulton
filed stipulations limiting the administrative law judge's inquiry to the legality of the challenged
superseniority clause as applied to the respondent union's recording secretary and financial secretarytreasurer. Id. at 2 n.2.
113. 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, slip op. at 1-2, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1361, 1361 (Mar. 7, 1983),
enforced sub nom., Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727
F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 2, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1361.
115. See id. at 10, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1364 (steward superseniority is justifiable only
because stewards need to maintain on-job presence to carry out responsibilities of office); cf.
American Can Co. (American Can II), 244 N.L.R.B. 736, 739 (1979) (Jenkins & Penello, concurring) (superseniority is lawful as applied to stewards only because stewards must be present on
job site to fulfill union office), enforced, 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981).
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perform no grievance processing or plant-level contract administration functions, the Board refused to permit the use of the superseniority device to protect the entire spectrum of the collective bargaining process. ' 6 The NLRB
thus held that the superseniority clause in Gulton was unlawful on its face
and that the respondent employer and the respondent union had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3), and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the NLRA." 7 NLRB decisions
subsequent to Gulton consistently have followed the rule established in Gulton
that layoff and recall superseniority is lawful only as applied to individuals
performing steward functions." 8
The NLRB's recent reversal in superseniority policy probably represents
little more than a change in NLRB personnel." 9 The membership of the NLRB
changes frequently.' Additionally, since the NLRB rarely exercises its formal or informal rulemaking powers under the Administrative Procedure Act,' 2 '
NLRB policy is susceptible to substantial variation as the political ideology
116. 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, slip op. at 10, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1364. In Gulton, the
NLRB did not specifically determine whether clauses granting superseniority to union officers

are presumptively lawful or unlawful. See id. at 13, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1364-65 (NLRB
will find lawful only superseniority provisions limited to officers who must be on job to perform
union duties). The tenor of the NLRB's decision, however, suggests that the party asserting the
validity of such a clause would bear the burden of proving that the beneficiary officer's union
responsibilities require that the officer maintain an on-the-job presence. See id. at 2, 112 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1361 (collective bargaining agreement may not accord superseniority lawfully to individuals performing no steward-type functions).
117. Id. at 13-14, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1365; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)(A),
(2) (1982) (§ 8 unfair labor practices committed by respondents in Gulton); see also supra notes
9-10 (discussion of employer and union unfair labor practices under NLRA § 8).
118. See, e.g., Local 826, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers (Otis Elevator),
268 N.L.R.B. No. 12, slip op. at 5, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1249, 1250 (Oct. 27, 1983) (under
Gulton precedent, superseniority clause was applied unlawfully to union financial secretary who
performed no steward functions); Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 267 N.L.R.B. No. 112, slip
op. at 9, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1076, 1078 (Aug. 26, 1983) (contract provision unlawfully accorded superseniority to union executive board members performing no substantial in-plant union
tasks), enforced, No 84-4005, No. 65 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 1984) (available on LEXIS Genfed library,
Cir. file); Design & Mfg. Corp., 267 N.L.R.B. No. 77, slip op. at 4, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1028,
1029 (Aug. 25, 1983) (respondents unlawfully applied superseniority clause to union officials performing no steward functions).
119. Cf. Cooke & Gautschi, PoliticalBias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35
INDus. & LAB. REn. REv. 539, 549 (1982). In a statistical study of NLRB unfair labor practice

decisions and NLRB member characteristics during the period from 1954-77, Professors William
Cooke and Frederick Gautschi concluded that the political composition of the NLRB plays a
significant role in the disposition of unfair labor practice cases by the NLRB. Id.; see infra notes
124-28 and accompanying text (discussion of changes in political composition of NLRB between
Limpco and Gulton decisions).
120. See supranote 4 (5 NLRB members serve staggered terms of 5 years each). Since June,
1977, when the NLRB decided United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. (Limpco Mfg.,
Inc.), I1 individuals have served as members of the NLRB. See CONG. Q.'s FEDERAL REGuLATORY
DiRECTORY 1979-1984 (discussion of NLRB membership changes and biographical sketches of

members from 1977-83).
121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-57 (1982) (agency rulemaking procedure under Administrative

Procedure Act); see National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982) (NLRB shall have
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of the NLRB membership changes.' 22 Of the NLRB members taking part in

the Board's Limpco decision, only dissenting Member Jenkins remained on
the NLRB when the Board decided Gulton. 2 3 Additionally, Member Jenkins
was the only member of the aggregate majority in American Can I1 to con-

power to make, amend, and rescind rules according to procedure established in Administrative
Procedure Act). Section 551(4) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines a rule as
a particular statement by an agency of law, policy, or procedure that the agency will apply only
prospectively. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). Section 553 of the APA establishes the minimal procedure which
agencies are required to follow when making, amending, or rescinding rules. Id. § 553. Section
553 of the APA requires at the very least that an agency publish notice of any proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register 30 days before the effective date of the proposed rule and that the
agency allow interested individuals to submit comments before the agency takes any final action.
Id. § 553. Although § 6 of the NLRA empowers the NLRB to issue rules under § 553 of the
APA, the NLRB rarely makes rules in accordance with the APA § 553 provisions. See id. §
156 (NLRB shall have power to issue, amend, and rescind rules in accordance with APA); K.
DAvis, ArmSTRATrvE LAW TExT 152-53 (3d ed. 1972) (NLRB never exercised rulemaking power
under NLRA § 6 before 1970). Instead, the NLRB defines substantive law and policy on a controversial case by case basis through the adjudication of particular disputes. See K. DAvis, supra
at 152-53 (NLRB effectively generates "rules" through adjudication of particular cases). Although
the Supreme Court has held that administrative agencies generally may exercise some discretion
in determining whether to formulate policy through rulemaking or adjudication, the Court on
at least one occasion has rebuked the NLRB for relying excessively on adjudication as a means
of promulgating substantive law. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)
(NLRB may announce new principles through adjudication rather than rulemaking as long as
NLRB's decision to do so does not constitute abuse of discretion); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery
II), 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (SEC enjoys discretion to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication
in formulating agency policy and interpreting substantive law). But see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (plurality opinion) (NLRB may not circumvent APA rulemaking
requirements by making substantive law in context of adjudicatory proceedings); see generally
Note, NLRB Rulemaking: PoliticalReality Versus ProceduralFairness,89 YALE L.J. 982 (1980)
(discussion of advantages.and disadvantages of NLRB's implicit policy of rulemaking by
adjudication).
122. See Cooke & Gautschi, supra note 119, at 549 (political composition of NLRB significantly
influences disposition of NLRB unfair labor practice cases). The NLRB's tendency to change
course as the Board's political make-up changes is particularly evident in a line of cases addressing the question whether the NLRB should invalidate union representation elections on account
of pre-election misrepresentations by employers or unions. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263
N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (NLRB generally will not set aside election results on account of misrepresentations since employees are able to recognize and discount propaganda), overruling General
Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 620 (1978) (NLRB should set aside election results when
one or more parties make material pre-election misrepresentations since such misrepresentations
may affect outcome of election), overrulingShopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311,
1311-13 (1977) (NLRB should not police content of pre-election misrepresentations since propaganda seldom sways employee votes), overruling Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221,
224 (1962) (NLRB should set aside election whenever party makes material misrepresentations
at time that prevents other parties from disproving statement).
123. Compare United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. (Limpco Mfg., Inc.), 230
N.L.R.B. 406 (1977) (Chairman Fanning, Members Murphy & Walther; Members Jenkins & Penello,
dissenting), review denied sub nom. D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1978) with Gulton
Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1361 (Mar. 7, 1983) (Chairman
Miller, Members Jenkins, Hunter & Zimmerman), enforced sub nom., Local 900, Int'l Union
of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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tinue with the NLRB through the Gulton decision.21 4 Two of the three members
joining Member Jenkins in the NLRB's Gulton decision were appointees of
an administration which many critics have regarded as pro-management or
even anti-union." 5 Many commentators have characterized the NLRB members
who decided Gulton and subsequent cases as unconcerned with the interests
of organized labor.'2 6 Although political considerations may have played a
substantial role in the NLRB's decision in Gulton, the NLRB's new approach
to contractual superseniority nevertheless is grounded soundly in public
policy. 27
The NLRB's Gulton decision correctly recognizes that the rights of organized labor derive from the rights of employees.128 Accordingly, when a union's
exercise of union rights interferes with the rights of an employee the union
must yield unless the benefit of the union's actions to all employees in the
organizational unit substantially outweighs the harm to the disadvantaged
employee.' 2 9 In Gulton, the NLRB distinguished between superseniority clauses
favoring stewards and superseniority clauses favoring union officers whose
124. Compare American Can Co. (American Can II), 244 N.L.R.B. 736 (1979) (Members
Jenkins, Penello & Murphy; Chairman Fanning & Member Truesdale, dissenting), enforced, 658
F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981) with Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 112 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1361 (Chairman Miller, Members Jenkins, Hunter & Zimmerman), enforced sub nom.,
Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
125. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1982, at 26, col. 4 (AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland charges
that Reagan Administration is insensitive to workers); Reagan NLRB Tilts Toward Management,
Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 17, col. 2 (critics charge that Reagan appointees to NLRB decide
cases with anti-union bias). Member Hunter was appointed to the NLRB by President Reagan
and was confirmed by the Senate in September, 1981. See CONG. Q.'s FEDERAL REGULATORY
DIRECTORY 1983-84 379-80 (biographical summary of NLRB Member Robert Hunter). President
Reagan appointed Interim Chairman Miller to a recess appointment in December, 1982 pending
the confirmation of Donald Dotson's appointment to a full term as NLRB chairman in early
1983. See Wall St. J., Dec. 24, at 6, col. 5 (news report of President's announcement).
126. See Reagan'sNLRB Tips Toward Management, Bus. WK., July 6, 1981, at 27-28 (discussion of Reagan NLRB appointments anticipating vocal union opposition to appointment of Member
Hunter); Reagan NLRB Tilts Toward Management, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 17, col. 2 (quoting
ILGWU General Counsel Max Zimny as charging that Member Hunter's decisions on NLRB
reflect anti-union bias).
127. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussion of arguments supporting NLRB's
decision in Gulton).
128. Cf. Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, slip op. at 11-12, 112 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1361, 1364 (Mar. 7, 1983) (individual employee rights override union objectives unless
union objectives substantially aid union in representing all unit employees' interests), enforced
sub nom., Local 900, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184
(D.C. Cir. 1984); see notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussion of Gulton).
129. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). In Huffman, the Supreme
Court held that when Congress granted labor unions the exclusive right to represent all employees
in a bargaining unit, Congress impliedly imposed a corresponding duty to represent all employees
in the unit fairly. Id.; see § 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) (representative designated by majority
of unit employees shall be exclusive representative of all employees in bargaining unit); cf. also
Reagan NLRB Tilts Toward Management, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 17, col. 2 (quoting NLRB
Member Hunter) (Congress enacted NLRA "to protect employees, not to insure the protection
of labor organizations").
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union duties do not require an on-the-job presence. 13 Although the latter class
of superseniority clauses genuinely may assist a union in representing the
employees in an organizational unit, the NLRB noted that unions may achieve
the same advantages in employee representation by other means less destructive of individual employee rights. 3 ' In 1947, Congress recognized that the
unchecked power of organized labor can be as destructive of employee rights
and of the public interest as can the unchecked power of management.'
In
enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress sought to establish a delicate balance
in labor relations between the often conflicting interests of employers,
employees, and labor organizations. 33 In Gulton, the NLRB restored Congress' delicate balance to the formerly skewed field of contractual
superseniority.
Joinr T. MuRRAY

130. 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, slip op. at 10, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1364; see supra notes
108-17 and accompanying text (discussion of NLRB's decision in Gulton).
131. See 266 N.L.R.B. No. 84, slip op. at 12-13, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1364 (advantages
achieved by superseniority in Gulton may be achieved by other less costly means such as paying
union officials for services rendered to union).
132. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, tit. I, § 101, 61 Stat.
136, 140 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982)); see also supra note 8 (discussion of legislative
history of Taft-Hartley Act).
133. See supra note 8 (discussion of Taft-Hartley legislative history); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982) (codification of employee rights under NLRA § 7); supranotes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussion of employee rights under NLRA § 7).

